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INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS POLICY: 
POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR UKRAINE
This paper investigates historical examples and experience o f  interest rate restrictions, consequences o f  
such policies for economy, reasons and outcomes o f  easing IIR policies as well as possibilities, possible 
outcomes and recommendations regarding IRR policy in Ukraine. It might be concluded that though some sort 
o f “anti-usury ” restrictions can be reasonable, administrative regulation (ceiling) o f  interest rate level will 
generate more negative than positive consequences for the economy and Mill unlikely be effective. Authorities 
shotild concentrate on more “thoughtful ” regulations which would constraint information asymmetry, provide 
balanced monetary policy and develop important modern segments offinancial markets.
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Introduction and literature review. The research 
topic on suitability, effectiveness and consequences of 
interest rate restrictions (ceiling) is relevant for current 
situation in Ukraine as well as extremely high level of 
interest rates during last two years produced many pro­
posal by policymakers to introduce administrative reg­
ulations of interest rates. Some resent research shows 
that discussion regarding interest rate restrictions is 
important and relevant for other countries as well (see, 
for example, recent EU report [10]).
The topic of economic consequences of interest 
rate restrictions and anti-usury laws was investigat­
ed by number of researchers such as Eichengreen 
and Garber [4], Bodenhom [1], Duval [3], Fernando
[5], Glaeser and Scheikman [6], Reifner [10], Rock- 
off [11], Tuccillo, Masciandaro, Davis, Temin and 
Voth, and many others.
The main goals of this paper is investigation of 
macro and micro reasons of the long period of high re­
al interest rates, which has few precedents in econom­
ic history, as well as possible consequences of impos­
ing administrative interest rate restrictions policy in 
current Ukrainian institutional environment. Main 
findings and recommendations are given in the sec­
tion 5 “Conclusion” and can be briefly summarized as 
follows. Implemented in isolation, interest rate restric­
tions will likely produce more negative than positive 
economic consequences. At the same time, reduction 
of market interest rates, which is considered as desira­
ble for the economy, can be achieved by complex set 
of coordinated policy: from changes in monetary poli­
cy to regulatory and institutional reforms aimed at de­
velopment of more efficient financial market.
Main research results
1. Reasons for High Levels of Real Interest 
Rates. Figure 1 shows inflation and average deposit 
and credit rates in Ukraine during 2012-2013. Start­
ing from the beginning of 2012 consumer price
Fig. 1. Inflation, Average Credit and Deposit Rates in Domestic Currency in Ukraine, 2012-2013
Source: National Bank of Ukraine/
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inflation was almost zero while interest rates on loans 
remained at levels above 15 %. In reality interest 
rates on business loans were well above 20 %. As for 
consumer credit, effective interest rates were in the 
range from 15-20 % (for car loans and mortgages) to 
30-80 % or even more in some cases (credit cards 
and other unsecured loans).
There can be several reasons for such high levels 
of real interest rates:
(1) Expected devaluation. One of the common 
reasons to explain high interest rate in domestic cur­
rency is interest rate differential between domestic 
and foreign currency interest rates due to devaluation 
expectations. Relatively high level of dollarization 
explains the fact that only substantially higher hry­
vnia interest rates can stimulate economic agents to 
hold deposits in domestic currency.
(2) High sovereign risk of default. While Ukraine 
is not deeply connected with international markets, 
interest rates on Ukrainian Eurobonds may influence 
internal interest rates through many channels. Quota­
tion on Ukrainian CDS (credit-default swaps) during 
2012-2013 rarely fell below 6-7 %. It directly influ­
ences the cost of foreign financing for Ukrainian 
companies, particularly banks and through this chan­
nel creates pressure on local interest rates.
(3) Monetary policy. High interest rates are often as­
sociated with tight monetary policy, hi the case of 
Ukraine is difficult to say that monetary policy after the 
2008 crisis was really tough. Money supply grew at a 
rate significantly higher than the growth rate of 
GDP. There were no significant restrictions on bank re­
financing. Refinancing rate of the National Bank of 
Ukraine has consistently declined. It should be noted 
that in the case of Ukraine, the possibility of a more ex­
pansionary monetary policy limited to the balance of 
payments and low international reserves, which consist­
ently declining during 2012-2013. By the beginning of
2014 the volume of reserves barely exceeds 15 billion 
dollars, which is less than three months of imports.
(4) Asymmetric information and market power. 
Credit market, especially some its segments (e.g. con­
sumer loans), can be described with high degree of 
asymmetric information. This asymmetric information 
may lead to exercising of market power by lenders and 
high level of prices (effective interest rates). As for the 
Ukrainian banking system, Mertens and Urga [7] re­
ported the result on inefficiency of Ukrainian banking 
system and noted that "one of the main findings of the 
research is that banks operate more efficiently in terms 
of cost but less efficiently in terms of profit. This dif­
ference could suggest the existence of market power in 
the Ukrainian financial sector where large banks can 
realize greater profits having at the same time greater 
costs”. It is worth to note that this market power may
result not from industry concentration but rather in­
duced by asymmetric information and non-rational be­
havior of some consumer segments.
2. Interest Rate Restrictions and Usury laws in 
US and Europe. So-called "anti-usury” regulation has 
long history in Western countries. As noted by Boden- 
hom [1] "few pieces of economic regulation are ubiq­
uitous as usury limits” and one of the most important 
reason for usury laws is to "protect small borrowers 
from the depredations of unscrupulous lenders when 
interest rates rise markedly”. Nearly every U.S. state 
and almost every European country imposed a usury 
limit. According to Glaeser and Scheikman [6], inter­
est rate restrictions are among the most pervasive 
forms of economic regulations. Interest rate limits 
could be Pareto improving because agents borrow 
when they have temporary negative income shocks -  
interest rate restrictions transfer wealth to agents who 
have received those negative shocks and whose mar­
ginal utility of income is high. The history of usury 
laws suggests that this social insurance mechanism is 
one reason why usury laws persist, but it also suggests 
that usury laws have had different functions across 
time (e.g. rent-seeking, limiting agency problems 
within the church, limiting over-commitment of debts, 
and attacking commerce generally).
In the United States, legislation to limit usury exists 
today at the legislative level in almost all states: usually 
there is a so-called legal interest rate (5 % to 10 % per 
annum) and restrictions on "usury” interest (12 % to 
24 % in absolute terms or in relation to the existing rates 
of the Federal Reserve banks). While in most states 
there is a large number of exceptions for certain seg­
ments of the debt market imposed by modem laws or 
court decisions, legislative restrictions are maintained.
Published in 2011 the European Commission re­
port [2] indicates that almost all EU member states 
have regulatory rules in some form of interest rates 
restrictions. 14 countries have either absolute 
(Greece, Ireland, Malta) or the relative restrictions on 
certain basic rates (Belgium, Estonia, France, Germa­
ny, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slo­
venia). The spread of interest rate ceilings is usually 
high. For example, "in France the spread between 
ceilings for the different forms of credit was between 
5.72 % pa and 21.63 % pa as at March 2010” [2]. It is 
also worth to note that "some countries provide such 
ceilings only exceptionally”. There is also a wide 
range of different enforcement systems in different 
European countries, as well as "common principles 
of fairness in competition, standard contract terms 
and consumer information law, already harmonized 
through the respective EU Directives, do not cover 
the pricing of credit”.
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3. Economic Consequences of Interest Rate Re­
strictions (IRR). The reasons for governments and 
businesses to propose administrative methods of inter­
est rates ceiling are that high real interest rates may 
have a very detrimental effect on the economy. In gen­
eral equilibrium long-term equilibrium level of the re­
al interest rate corresponds to the rate of economic 
growth. Only in this case, the increase in production 
and income allows firms and households to pay off 
creditors without reducing equity (for companies) and 
real income (for households). Excessive interest rates 
mean for businesses that only high yielding and of­
ten -  the most risky projects can be implemented, 
while projects with a “normal” level of return on capi­
tal are unable to obtain financing and that fact nega­
tively affects economic growth. In the household sec­
tor, high interest rates lead to increase in income ine­
quality, because income growth cannot offset the cost 
of the loan. High interest rates on deposits significant­
ly limit the development of non-banking financial mar­
ket segments, and in the banking sector creates adverse 
selection phenomenon -  when the most favorable 
terms of deposits are offered by the least reliable banks.
Credit market in some countries and during some 
historical periods can be described as a market with 
high level of information asymmetry. Some econo­
mists also argue that consumer behavior can be charac­
terized as non-rational in many cases. According to 
Reifner at al [10], “Behavioral biases (such as wishful 
thinking or underestimation of exponential growth) 
may lead to systematic (and predictable) deviations 
from rational behavior which lead to suboptimal con­
sumer decisions. ... As a consequence of wishful 
thinking, consumers' beliefs about event risk may be 
distorted: they may be willing to borrow money even 
when it is rather unrealistic that their future income 
will be sufficient to repay the debt. Consumers may al­
so underestimate the true cost of borrowing. This 
might occur because they hold erroneous beliefs about 
the actual time period during which they will use the 
credit.” Information asymmetry and non-rational be­
havior may lead to market inefficiency and market 
power exercised by lenders.
With regard to the negative consequences of ad­
ministrative restrictions in interest rates, most studies 
note the following (e.g. [3; 4; 5; 10; 11]):
1) administrative regulation of interest rates, as 
well as any price regulation may distort the market. 
Market equilibrium may become unreachable and 
many categories of borrowers lose access to credit;
2) banks are trying to compensate for the decline 
in interest rates through an increase in commissions 
and charges;
3) administrative restrictions can lead to increased 
illegal credit market and to increase of credit from 
non-bank sources (late bill payments, etc.) According 
to Bodenhom [1], when usury ceilings become bind­
ing, banks unable to equate supply and demand 
through price increases will adjust other terms of the 
loans to push the market toward equilibrium. Sub­
stantial changes in the non-price terms of credit can 
actually make small borrowers worse off because 
they are either cut off from credit or they are driven to 
other, sometimes disreputable, sources of credit. In­
terest rate ceilings force some borrowers into the 
hands of lenders who employ inefficient and extra-le- 
gal methods of enforcement and collection;
4) administrative regulation of interest rates re­
duces the volume of lending in the economy because 
e.g. “high-risk or low-wealth borrowers are excluded 
from credit markets when freely fluctuating market 
rates rise above the usury limit”.
Nonetheless, reality is not so unambiguous. For ex­
ample, EU study [2] shows (table 1) that it is plausible
Table 1. Research Conclusions on Interest Rate Restrictions (IRR) in European Union
Hypothesis Conclusion
IRR reduce credit access, in particular for low-income borrowers. plausible
IRR lead to a decline in the volumes of consumer credit granted. unlikely
Without IRR, more product types exist in the market. plausible
IRR lead to credit from non-bank sources, such as paying bills late. inconclusive
IRR lead to a substantial illegal market in lending. inconclusive
The lack of IRR leads to a higher level of over-indebtedness. unlikely
The lack of IRR has particularly adverse effects on default rates/overindebtedness in the presence 
of negative shocks (e.g. recessions) to the economy. inconclusive
The average consumer, -  or even more so: low-risk consumer, -  would be granted cheaper credit 
in the presence of IRR. inconclusive
IRR lead to increased charges as providers will try to compensate the reduced interest revenues 
by increased charges. plausible
IRR represent barriers to consumer credit market integration. inconclusive
IRR lead to lower levels of competition in the consumer credit industry. unlikely
IRR lead to a convergence of all consumer credit interest rates at the level of the interest rate cap. inconclusive
Source: [2].
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that interest rate restrictions reduce credit access, in 
particular for low-income borrowers, reduce number 
of product types in the market and lead to increased 
charges as providers will try to compensate the re­
duced interest revenues by increased charges. At the 
same time, there is no unambiguous evidence that such 
restrictions lead to increase of credit from non-bank 
sources, produce particularly adverse effects on over­
indebtedness, and create barriers to consumer credit 
market integration. It is also unlikely that interest rate 
restrictions lead to lower levels of competition in the 
consumer credit industry or to decline in the volumes 
of consumer credit granted.
4. Possibilities and Consequences of Inter­
est Rate Restrictions in Ukraine. The first im­
portant question regarding possibility to intro­
duce interest rate restrictions in Ukraine is wheth­
er or not such restrictions will be really effective. 
Banks have plenty of opportunities to replace 
high interest rate with larger charges and com­
missions. Even now some banks announce ex­
tremely low interest rate on loans (for example, 
0.1 % p.a.) but effective rate is extremely high 
(more than 100 % in some cases) because of high 
charges. It follows that significant changes in reg­
ulation practices are needed to make interest rate 
regulation policy effective.
The second factor which must be taken into ac­
count is connection between the state of internal fi­
nancial market and constraints for monetary policy 
in Ukrainian economy. Ukraine is a small open 
economy with de facto fixed (while de jure float­
ing) exchange rate regime. Amount of internation­
al reserves is extremely low and that fact substan­
tially restricts possibilities of monetary expansion 
and interest rate regulation. Exchange rate plays a 
central role of the only anchor for macroeconomic 
stability. Monetary authorities and foreign experts 
during long time discuss necessity to switch to a 
kind of "inflation targeting” regime which would 
allow more flexible monetary policy. But such a 
regime change require a complex set of measures 
not only in monetary policy but also in regulation 
of financial markets, development of not only 
banking but also non-banking segments of finan­
cial markets, as well as changes in market partici­
pants' perception of the stable exchange rate as the 
only sign of macro stability.
The third important set of problems is general 
state of financial markets in Ukraine. It is still ex­
tremely underdeveloped. The stock market is al­
most absent after 2008 crisis. Bank deposits be­
came the almost only internal possibility to invest 
for average savers. In this situation any adminis­
trative measures to decrease interest rates could 
lead to sharp decline in banking deposits and hit 
negatively banking sector and financial system as 
a whole.
5. Conclusion. Taking into account the cur­
rent international experience in implementing di­
rect administrative limits on interest rates, re­
search results, as well as the current state of 
Ukrainian economy, financial markets, the regu­
latory sphere, the following conclusions are made 
based on comparative analysis of IRR policy and 
corresponding research:
1) the introduction of severe restrictions on 
the level of interest rates without accompanying 
complex measures on banking regulation (in par­
ticular -  control over commissions and prices for 
other banking services, transparency and com­
pleteness of information for customers, etc.), and 
measures regulating non-banking financial mar­
ket segments is unlikely to be sufficiently effec­
tive. The banks have enough tools to compensate 
for the limitations of interest rates by increasing 
charges and prices for related services while ad­
ministrative possibilities to prevent such behav­
ior of banks are limited;
2) administrative restrictions on interest rates 
are unlikely to lead to the expansion of credit in the 
economy, but it can reduce the volume of deposits 
in local currency;
3) restrictions on interest rates are ineffective 
in absence of other measures aimed at reducing 
information asymmetries and limit market power 
lenders, protect consumers (borrowers) suffi­
ciently.
Instead of simple administrative decision to 
limit the interest rates, the government and the Na­
tional Bank of Ukraine could implement a set of 
measures in the field of development of financial 
markets, in particular:
1) a complex institutional reforms (notably in 
the field of protection of property rights, corporate 
governance, judiciary system) that would allow 
the inflow of foreign investment and decrease in­
terest spreads on Ukrainian debt. Such inflows 
achieve two goals: a) increase of the international 
reserves in order to mitigate the negative effect of 
expansionary monetary policy on the solvency of 
Ukraine, b) increase the money supply, which 
would finally help to reduce interest rates;
2) gradual steps towards the creation of a float­
ing exchange rate regime and switching toward a 
sort of inflation targeting regime. This, in turn, 
provides a set of measures to change the key objec­
tives and instruments of monetary policy;
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3) the introduction of a floating exchange rate re­
gime should be accompanied by a consistent policy 
to reduce the dollarization of the Ukrainian economy;
4) the program of action for building an open, 
transparent and efficient debt market, in the first 
place -  market of government bonds. Transparent 
and efficient market will create the conditions for 
effective pricing of credit resources;
5) administrative measures should be aimed 
primarily at reducing the information asymmetry 
and reducing the market power of banks in the 
credit market for better consumer protection;
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ПОЛІТИКА ОБМЕЖЕННЯ РІВНЯ ПРОЦЕНТНИХ СТАВОК: 
МОЖЛИВОСТІ І НАСЛІДКИ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ В УМОВАХ УКРАЇНИ
У 2012-2013 рр. рівень інфляції в Україні був практично нульовим, тоді як ставки за кредитами 
перевищували 20 % річних. Ситуацію, коли реальні процентні ставки знаходяться на такому 
високому рівні, можна пояснювати багатьма причинами, у  тому числі сподіваннями суб 'єктів ринку 
щодо знецінення гривні, жорсткістю монетарної політики, відносно високими ризиками суверенного 
дефолту, а також -  неефективністю ринку, спричиненою високим ступенем асиметрії інформації 
між кредиторами і позичальниками, нераціональністю суб 'єктів ринку, відсутністю чи 
нерозвиненістю важливих сегментів фінансового ринку. Все це спричинило появу пропозицій щодо 
прямого адміністративного регулювання граничного рівня процентних ставок по депозитних і 
кредитних операціях. У цій статті досліджено історичні пргікладгі та досвід адміністративних 
обмежень на верхню межу процентних ставок, наслідки таких обмежень для економіки, причини 
та умови відмови від практики прямого регулювання процентних ставок. Здійснений аналіз дозволяє 
спрогнозувати наслідки та сформулювати рекомендації щодо введення подібних обмежень в Україні.
Ключові слова: обмеження процентних ставок, монетарна політика, лихварство, фінансові 
ринки.
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